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The Trustees of the David L. Peterson Trust (referred to herein as "Appellant" or
"Peterson") hereby files this Appellant's Brief appealing certain orders of the Sixth
Judicial District Court in favor of Kyle and Heather Hall (referred to herein as "Appellee"
or "Hall").

I.

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION

This Court has jurisdiction, under Utah Code Ann. §78A-3-l 03(2)G), to review the
trial court's decision granting an easement by estoppel to Hall, awarding costs to Hall,
and denying Peterson's request for costs.
II.

1.

ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW

In examining all evidence in a light most favorable to Hall at the close of his casein-chief, did the trial court correctly detennine there was competent evidence that
would support a verdict for easement by estoppel in favor of Hall?

2.

Was there sufficient evidence presented at trial that reasonable minds could have
reached the conclusion that Hall was entitled to an easement by estoppel?

3.

If the award of an easement was proper, did the trial court's Order correctly

identify the scope and location of said easement?
4.

If the award of an easement was proper, was the trial court's Order regarding the

benefited parcels correct?
5.

Did the trial court err in Ordering Peterson to reimburse to Hall its court costs?

6.

Did the trial court err in denying Peterson's request for reimbursement of costs?

I
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III.

STANDARD OF REVIEW

It is well-established that the Court's "standard of review of a directed verdict is
the same as that imposed upon a trial court." Merino v. Albei"tsons, Inc., 1999 UT 14, ,I 3,
975 P.2d 467,468 (citations omitted). Such standard is that when "examining all
evidence in a light most favorable to the non-moving party, there is no competent
evidence that would support a verdict in the non-moving party's favor." Id. (citations
omitted). Further, it is only proper for a directed verdict motion to be granted "when the
moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law." Id.
With regard to the jury verdict, in Martinez v. Wells, 88 P.3d 343, which also
involved the award of an easement by a jury, the Court explained that "A jury verdict
should not be reversed due to insufficient evidence unless the evidence presented at trial
is so lacking that reasonable minds could not have reached the conclusion that the jury
reached." Id. at 345.
The scope and benefited parcels were not detennined as part of the jury verdict,
but instead by the trial court. Utah courts have held that the scope of an easement is a
question oflaw. Conatser v. Johnson, 2008 UT 48, iJ 10, 194 P.3d 897,900 (citations and
quotations omitted). When the "issues on appeal are purely legal in nature, [the Court
reviews] the district court's decision for correctness, without deference." Id. (citations and
quotations omitted).
The determination of the prevailing party should be reviewed under an abuse of

i.J

discretion standard, as explained in R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, il 25, 40 P.3d
1119, 1127.
2
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IV.

PRESERVATIONOFTHEISSUES

The issues raised in this brief were preserved by the Peterson's Motion for
Directed Verdict, trial presentation, Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict,
Objection to Proposed Judgment, Motion for Attorney's Fees, and Opposition to Hall's
Application for Costs and Peterson's Counterapplication for Costs.

V.

STATEMENT OF THE CASE

This appeal stems from a jury trial that took place in the Sixth District Court in
and for Sanpete County between February 2, 2015 and February 5, 2015. On September
6, 2013, Hall filed an Amended Complaint bringing claims for easement by estoppel,
prescriptive easement, easement by necessity, public road, recorded easement, and
wrongful denial of access. On the eve of trial, Hall abandoned three causes of action,
choosing only to pursue easement by estoppel, prescriptive easement, and public road.
During Hall's case-in-chief the only evidence presented to support an easement by
estoppel in favor of Hall was the testimony of Kyle Hall, Ronald Smith, and the readingin of portions of Lula Jean Thomas' deposition. At the close of Hall's case-in-chief,
Peterson moved for a directed verdict as to easement by estoppel and prescriptive
easement due to Hall's failure to present any competent evidence to satisfy each element
of such claims. The trial court denied Peterson's motion and the trial proceeded.
At the conclusion of trial the jury returned a verdict of "No" to public
thoroughfare and prescriptive easement, but granted an easement by estoppel to Hall.
Said verdict, however, did not specify the location, scope or benefited parcels of land that
the easement by estoppel was to attach.

3
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Post-trial Hall submitted an application for costs and a proposed judgment. Said
proposed judgment awarded an unrestricted easement to all four parcels of property
owned by Hall. Peterson objected to the proposed judgment and submitted its own
application for costs, along with a Motion for Judgment Notwithstanding the Verdict and
a Motion for Attorney's Fees for the three abandoned claims. Each of Peterson's motions
and applications were denied and the Hall's proposed judgment, which included an award
of costs, was entered by the trial court.

VI.

STATEMENT OF FACTS

David L. Peterson acquired real property in Sanpete County prior to 1965 (the
"Peterson Property"). See Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 163:20-24, February 3, 2015; Trial Tr. Vol. 3,
25:-1'-9, February 5, 2015. The Peterson Property is mountain property that is used
w}

primarily for grazing and recreational purposes. See Trial Tr. Vol. 3, 25:1-9. In 1965 and
1966, to gain access to an area on the Peterson Property later termed "Buckhorn Flats"
and to better access the spring located just east of Buckhorn Flats, Mr. Peterson built a
road across his property refe1red to throughout this litigation as the South Road or simply
the Road (the "Road"). See Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 163:20-24. The Road continued past
Buckhorn Flats and went beyond the Peterson Property to reach a spring. Id. Eventually,
Mr. Peterson conveyed the Peterson Property including Buckhorn Flats into the David L.
Peterson Trust (the "Trust"). Id. at 162:25-163 :6.
Buckhorn Flats is a flat area on the Peterson Property that was used by the
Peterson family for recreational and family activities. Id. at 196:12-199:25. During the
summer, the Peterson family would regularly go to Buckhorn Flats for picnics, to have
4
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campfire dinners, and to enjoy the sunset over Sanpete Valley. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2,
196:12-199:25. One of Mr. Peterson's children said that Buckhorn Flats was the happiest

~

place that she knew as a child. Id. While the Peterson children were growing up, it was a
family tradition for the Petersons to spend the Fourth of July at Buckhorn Flats. Id. at
245:15-17. Some of the Peterson children have passed on to their children the tradition of
going to Buckhorn Flats for the Fourth of July, hikes, camps, and other outdoor outings.
Id. at 196:246: 12-25. Buckhorn Flats is a family treasure to the Peterson family that is

filled with deep memories. Id. at 244:8-246:25.
The lawsuit brought by Hall included a number of causes of action designed to

lliJI

give Hall and the public at large access over the Road on the Peterson Property that runs
directly through Buckhorn Flats. See Am. Complaint, September 6, 2013. In an attempt to
preserve the privacy of their property, Peterson contests Hall's claims to have a right-oftravel over the Road through Buckhorn Flats.
In approximately 1996, a gate was placed on the Road preventing use of the Ro'ad

~

without a key. See Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 145:25-146:5. The gate on the Road prevented parties
from accessing Buckhorn Flats and other areas of the Peterson Property without a key. Id.
~

at 145:25-146:12. Peterson leased Buckhorn Flats to a chuck wagon company owned and
operated by Alden Johansen from 1996 to 2006. See Trial Exhibit 29. Mr. Johansen gave
Hall's grandfather a key to the gate in approximately 2006. See Trial Tr. Vol. I, 145:25146:24. In 2008, Peterson changed the lock on the gate to further protect their private
property. Id. at 150:14-17. In 2008, Peterson denied Hall's father's request for a key to
the new lock on the gate. Id. at 147:11-22. In 2010, Hall personally requested a key to the
5
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

lock for the gate on the Road. See Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 148:2-149:25. Hall's request for a key
to the gate on the Road was denied by Peterson. Id. at 171:7-20.
Knowing that he had to get through a locked gate to get to the Road that went
through the Peterson Property and knowing that his request for a key to the gate had been
denied by Peterson, between 2010 and 2013, Hall still purchased four parcels of real
property near the Peterson Property that that he intended to use the Road to access. Id. at
169:22-170:7, 163:1-4. He purchased the first of these four parcels of property in 2010
from Lula Jean Thomas (the "Thomas Property"). Id. at 163:20-25. Hall purchased the
second and third parcels of property from David Gobel in 2011 (the "Gobel Properties").

Id. at 163:8-16; 164:1-3. He purchased the fourth parcel of property from Alice Smith in
201J (the "Smith Property"). Id. at 163:17-19; 164:4-6. Hall purchased all four of these
properties after he knew that he couldn't getthrough the gate on the Road. Id. at 164: 1720 ..
As Hall claims, at least in part, that he has an easement by estoppel to the Road
over the Peterson Property based on the activities of the parties who previously owned
the four parcels of property that he purchased, the relevant historical ownership of such
properties should be considered. The first property purchased by Hall was the Thomas
Property. Id. at 163:20-164:6. Hall purchased this property from Lula Jean Thomas in
2010. Id at 163:23-25. Thomas owned the property from 1978 to 2010. See Trial Exhibit
4; Trial Tr. Vol 1, 163 :20-22. During the 32 years that she owned the property, Ms.

"

Thomas only visited it three or four times. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2 121: 12-17. Ms. Thomas
did not provide any testimony regarding reliance on use of the Road prior to the property
6
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being deeded to her. See generally Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 113: 10-127:11. She purchased the
property from Diversified Marketing. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 114: 1-24. There was no
relevant evidence presented at trial regarding Diversified Marketing's use of or reliance
on the Road. The Gobel Properties were the next properties purchased by Hall. There was
4&J

no evidence presented at trial regarding the historic ownership or use of the Gobel
Properties. The final property purchased by Hall was the Smith Property. See Trial Tr.
Vol. 1, 164:4-6. Mr. Smith purchased his parcel of property from an aerial photograph.

See Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 56:2-16. He then sold the property to his mother who sold it to Hall.
Id. at 50:15-19. Neither Mr. Smith nor his mother testified to using the Road or relying
on the Road prior to purchasing the Smith Property. See generally Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 49:859:18.
There were not facts presented at trial that were sufficient to support an easement
by estoppel by Hall nor his predecessors-in-interest.
VII.

A.

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS

Easement By Estoppel
This Court should reverse the trial court's detennination that Hall established an

easement by estoppel because Hall failed to present evidence that he or his predecessorsin-interest substantially changed position based on a reasonable reliance that they had
pennission to use the Road and that such pem1ission would not be revoked.
In this matter, there are six parties or entities that could have evidence that would
support Hall's easement by estoppel claim. Those six parties are Hall, Lula Jean Thomas,
Ronald Smith, Alice Smith, David Gobel, and Diversified Marketing. A review of the
7
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testimony or lack thereof of each of these witnesses shows there is no evidence to support
~

Hall's easement by estoppel claim.
First, Hall was aware prior to purchasing any of the four parcels of property that
he did not have pennission from Peterson to use the Road. Thus, Hall cannot establish
that he reasonably relied on use of the Road before he purchased the. four parcels of
property.
Next, Lula Jean Thomas does not have facts to support a claim that she relied on
use of the Road prior to purchasing her property. She was deeded the property as a
repayment of debt and there was no testimony at the time that she accepted the property
that she was relying on use of the Road to access the property. Additionally, she did not
go to the property until after she had received it. Thus, there is no evidence that she
accepted the property based on a reasonable reliance that she could use the Road to
access the property.

~

Third, Ronald Smith purchased his parcel of land from an aeiial photograph and is
not sure if he went to the property prior to purchasing it. He provided no testimony that
his decision to purchase the property was based on his ability to use the Road. Therefore,
he does not have evidence that he changed his position based on a reasonable belief that
he had permission to use the Road and would be able to continue to do so.
Finally, there was no testimony whatsoever from Alice Smith, David Gobel, or
Diversified Marketing. Therefore, a claim of an easement by estoppel cannot be
supported by any of these witnesses.

8
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Because there was not any competent evidence presented at trial that could satisfy
the elements necessary to establish an easement by estoppel, the trial court's denial of
Peterson's motion for directed verdict and eventual order granting Hall an easement by
estoppel was improper and should be reversed.

B.

Costs and Attorney's Fees
This Court should reverse the trial court's determination that Hall was the

prevailing party and its decision to award reimbursement of costs to Hall. Additionally,
the Court should reverse the trial court's denial of Peterson's application for
reimbursement of costs.
Hall brought six claims against Peterson, including easement by estoppel,
prescriptive easement, easement by necessity, public thoroughfare, recorded easement,
and wrongful denial of access. Hall dropped his claims for easement by necessity,
recorded easement, and wrongful denial of access claims on the eve of trial. Hall
continued to pursue the three remaining claims through trial. At the conclusion of trial,
Hall prevailed on easement by estoppel, the most restrictive of the claims he pursued.
Peterson prevailed on both public thoroughfare and prescriptive easement. Having
prevailed on two of the three claims presented at trial and five of the six claims brought
in the Amended Complaint, Peterson should have been deemed the prevailing party.

VIII. ARGU1\1ENT
The Court should reverse the trial court's ruling grapting Hall an easement by
estoppel as there was no competent evidence presented at trial to satisfy the necessary
legal elements of such an easement. Additionally, the Court should reverse the trial
9
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court's ruling establishing the scope of the easement and the parcels benefitted by such
easement as there was insufficient evidence to establish an easement, the scope· of the
easement, or the parcels benefitted by the easement. Finally, the Court should reverse the
trial court's order awarding costs to Hall and denying Peterson's request for costs.
A.

The Trial Court Erred in Awarding Hall an Easement By Estoppel as There
was Insufficient Evidence Presented at Trial to Establish Such an Easement.
An easement by estoppel is an equitable remedy that is to be employed when an

injustice can be avoided only by the creation of such an easement and the following
elements are established by preponderance of the evidence: 1) the owner or occupier of
the subject land permitted anothe~ to use that land; 2) under circumstances in which it
was reasonable to foresee that the user would substantially change position believing that
the pennission would not be revoked; and 3) the user did substantially change position in
reasonable reliance on that belief. Intermountain Res., LLC v. Jorgenson, 2010 U.S. Dist.
LEXIS 112566, *12-13 (quoting Restatement (Third) of Property (Servitudes)§ 2.10
(2000)). In the present matter, for Hall to be awarded an easement by estoppel over the
Road, he had to present evidence at trial that either through his own personal use of the
Road or through his predecessors-in-interest use of the Road all three elements of
easement by estoppel were satisfied. The infom1ation herein shows that neither Hall's use
of the Road nor his predecessors-in-interest use of the Road was sufficient to establish an
easement by estoppel.
1.

Hall Failed to Present Evidence Sufficient for the Trial Court to Find
that His Use of the Road Satisfied the Necessary Elements of Easement
By Estoppel.

10
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There was not competent evidence presented at trial to show that through his use
of the Road Hall satisfied the elements of easement by estoppel. Pursuant to the law set
forth above, to be awarded an easement by estoppel over the Road through his own use,
Hall had to present evidence to show that 1) Peterson allowed him to use the Road, 2)
under circumstances in which it was reasonable to foresee that Hall would change his
position believing that pennission would not be revoked, and 3) Hall did in fact change
his position based on that reasonable belief. The following evidence from trial shows that
Hall's use of the Road fails to satisfy the second and third elements of easement by
estoppel.
Kyle Hall testified at trial that at some times he had used the Road. See Trial Tr.
Vol. 1, 126:8-18. Although there was no evidence presented that Peterson had
affirmatively granted Hall pennission to use the Road, Hall's testimony of use alone is
. probably enough for the finder of fact to find that he had met the first element of
easement by estoppel. However, there was no evidence presented that would satisfy the
second and third elements of easement by estoppel based on Hall's use of the Road. In
fact, Hall's testimony shows that hls use did not satisfy the second and third elements.
€v

To satisfy the second element of easement by estoppel through his use, Hall had to
present evidence at trial that it was reasonable to believe that he would change his
position based on a reasonable belief that permission to use the Road would not be
revoked. The evidence presented at trial shows that it was not reasonable for Hall to
believe that pennission to use the Road would not be revoked. Hall testified that a locked
gate was put up denying access to the Road to anyone who did not have a key to the gate.

11
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See Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 145:25-146:12. Hall testified at one point his grandfather obtained a

key to the gate accessing the road. Id. at 145:25-146:24. However, in approximately
2008, the lock to the gate was changed and Hall no longer had access to the Road. Id. at
150:4-24. He requested a key to the new lock and his request was denied by Peterson. Id.
at 171 :7-20. Accordingly, after 2008, it was not reasonable for Hall to believe that
pennission to access the Road would not be revoked since Peterson had in fact already
01

revoked any permission it had given to Hall to use the Road. Additionally, it could not
have been reasonably foreseeable to Peterson that Hall would change his position after'
2008 on the basis that permission to use the Road would not be revoked since Peterson
had already revoked any such pennission. Thus, there was not adequate evidence
presented at trial to support a finding that Hall had satisfied the second element of
easement by estoppel through his own use of the Road.
Similarly, the third element necessary to establish an easement by estoppel was
not satisfied by Hall's use because Hall did not have a reasonable belief to change his
position. The evidence at trial was that sometime in 2008 Peterson revoked any

vJ

permission Hall had to use the Road. Id at 148:2-149:25, 171 :7-20. Then, in 2010, 2011,
and 2012, Hall purchased a total of four parcels of property which could be accessed by
the Road. See Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 163: 1-4. Hall did not purchase these four parcels of ·

41

property based on a reasonable belief that his permission to use the Road would not be
revoked because his permission to use the Road had been revoked approximately two
years before he purchased the first of the four parcels. Id. at 148:2-149:25, 171 :7-20.
Because any permission Hall may have had to use the Road had been revoked in 2008, he
12
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

did not purchase the first property in 2010 with a reasonable belief that pennission to use
the Road would not be revoked. Id. at 164: 17-20. Thus, Hall failed to present any

~

evidence at trial that his use of the Road satisfied the third element of easement by
estoppel. As there was no evidence showing Hall's use of the Road had satisfied the
second and third elements of easement by estoppel, the trial court could not grant Hall an
easement by estoppel based on Hall's use of the Road.

2.

Hall Failed to Present Evidence that His Predecessors-in-Interest
Satisfied the Elements Necessary to Establish an Easement By
Estoppel.

Having shown that Hall's use of the Road was insufficient to establish an
easement by estoppel, the next question is whether Hall presented evidence sufficient to
support an easement by estoppel through his predecessors-in-interest use of the Road.
Halls predecessors-in-interest to the four parcels of property are Ronald Smith, Alice
Smith, David Gobel,_Lula Jean_ Thomas, and Diversified Marketing. A review_ ofthe
relevant evidence presented at trial shows that none of Hall's predecessors-in-interest use
of the Road to access their respective parcel of property was sufficient to satisfy the
elements necessary to create an easement by estoppel.

a.

Smith Property

Hall purchased one of the subject properties from Alice Smith (the "Smith
Property"). See Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 163:17-19. Prior to Hall purchasing the Smith Property,
it was owned by Diversified Marketing, Ronald Smith, and Alice Smith. See Trial Tr.
Vol. 2, 50:4-19. For Hall to prevail on an easement by estoppel claim over the Road
through one of the prior owners of the Smith Property, there would have had to have been
13
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evidence at trial that at least one of the three prior owners satisfied all three elements
necessary to create an easement by estoppel. A look at the evidence presented at trial
shows that none of the prior owners of the Smith Property met the easement by estoppel
elements.
First, there was no admissible testimony or other evidence presented at trial
regarding Diversified Marketing's use or reliance on the Road. Kyle Hall speculated that
Diversified Marketing used the Road, but there was no competent evidence to support
such speculation. Even if there had been evidence that Diversified had pennission to use
the Road to access the Smith Property, there was no testimony or evidence of any kind
regarding whether Diversified Marketing had a reasonable belief that it would be allowed
to continue to use the Road or that it changed its position based on such reasonable belief.
Thus, Diversified Marketing cannot establish an easement by estoppel over the Road for
access to the Smith Property or for any other purpose.
Ronald Smith purchased the Smith Property from Diversified Marketing in 1974.
See Trial Exhibit 5. There was no competent evidence introduced at trial showing that

Ronald Smith had satisfied any of the three elements of easement by estoppel. See
generally Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 49:8-59:18. Regarding the first element of easement by

estoppel, there was no evidence presented that Ronald Smith was pennitted to use the
Road by Peterson. See generally Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 49:8-59:18. While Mr. Smith did testify
he used the Road "a couple of times" between 1974 and 1980, such use was after he
0J

purchased the property. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 52:16-18, 55:17-22, 56:5-21. Furthermore,
he affirmed that he never asked permission to use the Road. Id. at 53:18-20.
14
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Second, even if the Court finds that Mr. Smith had permission to use the Road,
since he only used the Road on a couple occasions between 1974 and 1980, Mr. Smith
fails to meet the second element requiring the use be such that it is reasonable for the
property owner or occupier to foresee that the user would substantially change position
believing that permission would not be revoked. As Mr. Smith only used the Road on a
couple oc_casions in six years, it would not be reasonable for Peterson to foresee that Mr.
Smith would substantially change position believing that pennission to use the Road
would not be revoked.
Lastly, Mr. Smith did not substantially change his position in reasonable reliance
on his belief that pennission to use the Road would not be revoked. As testified to at trial,
Mr. Smith purchased the property from Diversified Marketing based on an aerial
photography map. Id. at 56:2-16. He was unsure whether he even went to the property
before purchasing it. Id. at 56:5-57:2.-At no time did Mr. Smith testify or-anyone else.
testify that Mr. Smith purchased the Smith Property relying on use of the Road. Since Mr.
Smith was unsure of whether he even went to the property prior to purchasing it, he
certainly did not purchase the property on the reasonable belief that he would be able to
use the Road. Thus, Mr. Smith does not satisfy the third element necessary to establish an
easement by estoppel. Because Mr. Smith's use of the Road failed to satisfy the elements
necessary for an easement by estoppel, such an easement to the Smith Property cannot be
established through Ronald Smith.
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Alice Smith is the only other party that could have established an easement by
estoppel to the Smith Property. But, Ms. Smith did not testify at trial and therefore
provided no evidentiary support for the establishment of an easement by estoppel.
~

As the evidence presented during trial was insufficient to create an easement by
estoppel over the Road through Diversified Marketing, Ronald Smith, or Alice Smith's
use, Hall could not have obtained an easement by estoppel over the Road to the Smith
Property through his predecessors-in-interest. The previous information herein also
shows that Hall through his own use did not establish an easement by estoppel to any of
the subject properties. Accordingly, the trial court could not have correctly found that
there was sufficient evidence for Hall to have an easement by estoppel to the Smith
Property.

\YJ

b.

Gobel Properties

Hall purchased from David Gobel two of the four subject parcels of property that
can be accessed by the Road (the "Gobel Properties"). See Trial Tr. Vol. 1, 163:8-16. ·
There was no evidence presented at trial to support a finding that David Gobel used or
reasonably relied upon the Road to access the Gobel Properties or any other property. As
such, an easement by estoppel cannot be established through David Gobel. Additionally,
Hall did not present any evidence during trial regarding any prior owner's use of the
Road to access the Gobel Properties. Because there was no evidence presented regarding
David Gobel or other prior owner's use of the Road to access the Gobel Properties, Hall
~

cannot establish an easement by estoppel through his predecessors-in-interest in the
Gobel Properties.
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c.

The Thomas Property

The fourth of the parcels of property purchased by Hall was previously owned by
Lula Jean Thomas and Diversified Marketing (the "Thomas Property"). See Trial Tr. Vol.
2, 114: 15-24, 118: 15-16. There was no evidence presented at trial to support a finding
that either Ms. Thomas or Diversified Marketing had satisfied the elements necessary to
establish an easement by estoppel.
First, there was no evidence presented at trial that Ms. Thomas was permitted to
use the Road by Peterson. The only evidence of Ms. Thomas' use of the Road was
introduced through her deposition. While Ms. Thomas did state that she would
occasionally visit her lots when they were first deeded to her, she affirmed that she did
not get permission from anyone before using the Road. Id. at 115:4-116:25. Further, she
~

stated that she had only been to the property "three, maybe four" times during the 32
years_that.she owned the property between 197_8 and 2010.ld. at 121:12-17; see Trial
Exhibit 4; Trial Tr. Vol 1, 163:20-22.
Second, even if there was sufficient evidence to support a finding that Ms. Thomas
had permission to use the Road, there was no evidence presented sufficient to support a
finding that it was reasonable for Peterson to foresee that Ms. Thomas would substantial
change her position on the basis that pennission to use the Road would not be revoked.
Three, maybe four visits to a property over a span of 32 years of ownership is not enough
use for a property owner to reasonably foresee that Ms. Thomas would substantially
change her position believing pennission to use the Road would not be revoked.
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Finally, there was no evidence presented at trial that Ms. Thomas did change her
position on a belief that she would have permission to use the Road. The evidence
presented at trial was clear; Ms. Thomas was simply deeded the property by Diversified
Marketing when Diversified Marketing was unable to pay a debt. See Trial Tr. Vol. 2,
114:1-24. There was no evidence presented that Ms. Thomas used the Road or relied on
use of the Road prior to accepting the property from Diversified Marketing. See generally
Trial Tr. Vol. 2, 113: I 0-127: 11. She did not even visit the property until after it was
deeded to her. Id. at 115 :4-17. Thus, Ms. Thomas did not make a substantial change in
her position based upon a reasonable reliance that her use of the Road would not be
revoked. The evidence is that she had no knowledge of the Road when it was deeded to
her. As such, the third element necessary to establish an easement by estoppel to the
Thomas Property was not satisfied by Ms. Thomas.
Similarly, as set forth above, there was no evidence presented at trial that
Diversified Marketing had permission to use the Road, that it was foreseeable that
Diversified Marketing would change its position based on a belief that it would be able to
continue to use the Road, nor that Diversified Marketing changed its position on the
reasonable belief that it would be able to continue to use the Road. Therefore, an
easement by estoppel to the Thomas Property was not established through Diversified
~

Marketing. Because neither Ms. Thomas nor Diversified Marketing presented evidence
sufficient to establish an easement by estoppel to the Thomas Property, Hall cannot claim
an easement by estoppel through their alleged use of the Road.

3.

Summary of Easement by Estoppel Claim
18
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The above information shows that there was insufficient evidence at trial to
support a finding that Hall had satisfied the three elements necessary to establish an
easement by estoppel through his own use of the Road or through the use of the Road by
his predecessors-in-interest. As such, the trial court erred in denying Peterson's motion

(iv

for directed verdict and granting Hall an easement by estoppel. The trial court's order
granting such easement should be reversed.
B.

Assuming Argue11do that the Awarding of an Easement By Estoppel was
Proper, the Trial Court Did Not Correctly Identify the Scope and Location of
the Easement.
The Judgment proposed by Hall and entered by the trial court provides Hall

unlimited ingress and egress over the Peterson Property with no limitation or restriction
as to the number of individuals, number or type of vehicle, or time of day or time of year.

ii

Judgment, 2-3, March 16, 2015. However, such scope lacks any support from the
evidence presented at trial.
It has been established that the scope of an easement is generally determined by
the easement's manner of creation. See generally, Walker v. 300 S. Main, LLC, No. 2:05CV-442 TS, 2008 WL 4862424, at *1 (D. Utah Nov. 7, 2008) and Valcarce v. Fitzgerald,

961 P.2d 305 (Utah 1998). Thus, since an easement by estoppel requires that that the
owner or occupier of land pennitted another to use the land and such pennission was
relied upon when the user substantially changed his or her position, it is that permission
and use that should create the scope of the easement.
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During the trial, Hall not only failed to establish that he or his predecessors-ininterest had pennission to use the Road or substantially changed their position as a result
of said pennission, he failed to show what the permitted use was. There was certainly no
evidence presented at trial that would support a finding of an unlimited easement
allowing for ingress and egress over the Peterson Property any time of the year with any
type of vehicle. Therefore, the trial court's order on the scope of the easement should be
vacated and remanded to the trial court for further determination.
C.

Assuming Argeundo that the Awarding of an Easement By Estoppel was
Proper, the Trial Court's Judgment Regarding the Benefited Parcels was
·Incorrect.

The Judgment proposed by Hall and entered by the trial court provides that the
easement by estoppel attaches to four dominant estates in Sanpete County owned by Hall.
Judgment, 2-3, March 16, 2015. Although, the jury found that an easement by e~toppel
had been established, the jury made no finding as through which predecessors-in-interest
Hall obtained the easement or to which parcels of property were benefitted by the
easement. See Trial Tr. Vol. 3, 193:10-194:14. As set forth above, there was insufficient
evidence at trial to establish an easement by estoppel to Hall or his predecessors-ininterest. Therefore, it is impossible to detennine which dominant estate is to be benefited.
Accordingly, the trial court's order on the parcels benefitted by the easement should be
vacated and remanded to the trial court for further detennination.
D.

The Award of Costs to Hall Rather Than Peterson was Improper as Peterson
Should Have Been Deemed the Prevailing Party.
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The trial court's award of costs to Hall was improper as Peterson prevailed on five
of the six claims originally brought by Hall and two of the three claims argued at trial.
See Trial Tr. Vol. 3, 193:10-194:14. While Hall did prevail on the claim of easement by

estoppel, Peterson prevailed on public thoroughfare and prescriptive easement, which
would have created a significantly greater burden than the easement by estoppel, which
only benefits specific parcels. Id.
Utah courts have noted the difficulty in determining the prevailing party in
complicated matters involving multiple claims. When such situations arise, the court
should consider the number of claims brought by the parties, the importance of the claims
relative to each other and their significance in the context of the lawsuit considered as a
whole. See R.T. Nielson Co. v. Cook, 2002 UT 11, , 25, 40 P.3d 1119, 1127.
First, in considering the number of claims, Peterson is the prevailing party. There
were six claims originally brought (three of which were abandoned on the eve oftrial}- .
and Hall only prevailed on one. See Trial Tr. Vol. 3, 193: 10-194:14. In reviewing the
second and third considerations, the importance of the claims and their significance in the
context of the lawsuit, the considerations also weigh in favor of Peterson as the prevailing
party. While it is true, Hall's success on the easement by estoppel allowed him to use the
Road, the easement only attaches to the benefited parcels. This easement is far less
burdensome to Peterson than a public thoroughfare or prescriptive easement, which are
the two claims Peterson prevailed. Prevailing on prescriptive easement and public
thoroughfare was critical for Peterson to prevent unlimited access over the Road.
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As Peterson prevailed on five of the six original claims brought, including the
~

most important and significant claims, Peterson,. not Hall, should have been awarded
costs pursuant to Utah Rules of Civil Procedure Rule 54.

CONCLUSION
Hall failed to provide competent evidence for which reasonable minds could
determine that Hall or his predecessors-in-interest had been given permission to use the
Road, had reasonably relied on that permission, and had substantially changed their
position based on a reasonable belief that such permission would not be revoked.
Therefore, the trial court's order granting Hall an easement by estoppel should be
reversed.
..•

Additionally, the trial court erred in designating the scope, location and benefitted
parcels from the easement. Peterson requests that the Court vacate and remand the trial
court's ruling on this issue.

C1'

Finally, since Peterson was the prevailing party, the trial court should have
awarded costs to Peterson not Hall. Thus, Peterson requests that the Court reverse the

v;

trial court's decision on the awarding of costs.
DATED this the 26th day of October, 2015.
HANSEN WRIGHT EDDY & HAWS, P.C.

lJI
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CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that on October 26, 2015, I mailed two copies of the attached

Appellant's Brief to Russell Cline, to Crippen & Cline LC, 10 West 100 South, Suite
425, Salt Lake City, Utah 84101, and to Troy L. Booher and Clemens A. Landau, to
Zimmerman Jones Booher LLC, Felt Building, Fourth Floor, 341 South Main Street, Salt
Lake City, Utah 84111, counsel for Appellees.

~
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Addendum#5

Judgment
Transcript of Trial Court's Ruling on Motion for Directed Verdict
Trial Exhibit 4 - Special Warranty Deed - Diversified Marketing,
Inc. to Ray C. Thomas and Lula Jean H. Thomas
Trial Exhibit 5 - Warranty Deed - Diversified Marketing, Inc. to
Ronald Jay Smith and Cecile Marjorie Dixon Smith
Trial Exhibit 29-Property Use Agreement Between J\1r. David L.
Peterson & Horseshoe Mountain Resort L.C.
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Russell A. Cline (4298)
Crippen & Cline LC
10 West 100 South, Suite 425
Salt Lake City, Utah 84101
(801) 539-1900 Office
(801) 322-1054 Facsimile

Attorney for Plaintiffs
IN THE SIXTH JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
SANPETE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

KYLER. HALL AND HEATHER HALL
Plaintiffs,

JUDGMENT

v.
DAVID L. PETERSON AS TRUSTEE OF
THE DAVID L. PETERSON LIVING
TRUST DATED, MARCH 2, 2006

Case No. 120600065
Judge: Marvin Bagley

Defendant.

A jury trial having been held on February 2, 3 and 5, 2015 and Kyle R. Hall and Heather
Hall (the "Halls") having been represented by Russell A. Cline and The David L. Peterson Living
Trust, dated March 2, 2006 having been represented by Kasey L. Wright and based on the Special
Verdict entered by the Jury in this matter and good cause appearing, it is hereby ordered, decreed
and adjudged as follows:
1. The Court grants Kyle R. Hall and Heather Hall an easement by estoppel.
2. The Court hereby grants and declares an easement across the existing road that crosses the

March 16, 2015 04:38 PM
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property belonging to the David L. Petersen Living Trust, dated March 2, 2006 as described
below, which existing road is depicted on the survey attached hereto as Exhibit A, (the
"Road"), which easement grants plaintiffs and all successive owners of the dominant estate
~

described below, together with all guests and invitees thereof, full complete, unrestricted and
unlimited ingress and egress to and from the dominant estate described below for· any
purpose, all of which is without limitation or restriction as to number of individuals, number
or type of vehicle, or time of day or time of year.
3. The servient estate burdened by this easement is in Sanpete County, Utah, more fully
described as follows:
(Legal description) The South East Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of
Section 32; The South Half of the Southwest Quarter of Section 33; in
Township 14 South, Range 5 East; and Lot 4 of Section 4, in Township
15 South, Rage 5 East of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian.

~

The South West Quarter of the Southeast Quarter of Section 33, in
Township 14 South, Range 5 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
The Southeast Quarter of the Southwest Quarter of Section 33, in
Township 14 South, Range 5 East, of the Salt Lake Base and Meridian.
Tax Parcel Number: S-22522
1. The dominant estate benefitted by this easement is property in Sanpete County more fully
described as follows:
(Legal description): BEGS 990 FT,660FT E NW COR LOT 2,SEC 4-15SE;S 330 FT,E 660 FT.N 330 FT,W 660 FT TO BEG CONT SAC BEG S
660 FT NW COR LOT 2,SEC 4-15-SE,S 173.25 FT,E 660 FT,S 156.75
FT,E 660 FT,N 330 FT,N330 FT,W 1320 FT TO BEG CONT 7.625AC
TOTAL 12.625AC
Parcel Tax Number: S-26900Xl
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(Legal description): BEG NW COR SEC 3-15-SE N89d31 '13"E 625.47
FT,S0l CS8'15"E 679.86 FT,S88~4'43"W 299.60 FT,S 54.12 FT, S88
0
44'43"W 330 FT,N0l t38'22"W 742.51 FT TO BEG CONT 9.97 ACRES
Parcel Tax Number: S-26895Xl 0
(Legal description) BEGINNING SOUTH 01°38'22"EAST 504.90 FEET,
ALONG THE EAST SECTION LINE OF THE NORTHEAST CORNER
OF SECTION 4, TOWNSHIP 15 SOUTH, RANGE 5 EAST, SALT
LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; THENCE WEST 1320 FEET,
THENCE SOUTH 226.13 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 89°32'05"EAST
1320 FEET, THENCE NORTH 237.61 FEET TO PRIOR POINT OF
THE BEGINNING. CONTAINING 7.02 AC
Tax Parcel Number: 26896Xl
(legal description) BEGINNING SOUTH 01°38'22" East 742.51 FEET,
ALONG THE EAST SECTION LINE, OF THE NORTHEAST
CORNER OF SECTION 4, TOWNSHIP 15 SOUTH, RANGE EAST,
SALT LAKE BASE AND MERIDIAN; THENCE NORTH
89°32'05"WEST 1320 FEET, THENCE SOUTH 519,835 FEET,
THENCE EAST 1320 FEET, THENCE NORTH 509.84 FEET EAST
SECTION LINE TO PRIOR POINT OF BEGINNING. CONTAINING
15.60 AC
Parcel Tax Number: 26896X9

~

~

~

1. The easement granted hereunder shall attach to the land and run with the land and is binding
on all successors in interest to the servient estate and the dominant estate.
2. The Halls claims for prescriptive easement and public thoroughfare are dismissed on the

merits and with prejudice.

3. Plaintiffs are awarded costs against defendant in the amount of $2,892.26.
The above completes the order of the Court.

APPROVED AS TO FORM

- - - - - - - - - - Date: - - - - - -
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Kasey L. Wright
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING
I HEREBY CERTIFY that on the 12th day of February, 2015, I caused to be delivered via email to the following:

Gi)

Kasey L. Wright
Hansen Wright Eddy & Haws, P.C.
266 S. Pleasant Grove Blvd., Suite 202
Pleasant Grove, Utah 84062

Isl Russell A.

(j)
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CASE NO. 120600065
APPELLATE NO. 20150329
2 DEPT. MANTI - DISTRICT #2
3

IN THE SIXTH DISTRICT COURT IN
AND FOR SANPETE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
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2
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The elements
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1

but,

2

jury question.

3
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the issue of what
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SPECIAL WARRANTY DEED ~~:~~:~' . (;
[CORPORATE FORM]

DIVERSIFIED MARKETING, INC.
, a corporation
organized and existing under the laws of the State of Utah, with its princip~.l office at·
0 rem
, of County of Utah
, State of Utah,
g-rantor, hereby CONVEYS AND WARRANTS against aH claiming by, through or under it to

i'

Ray C. Thomas and Lula Jean H. Thomas

grantee
of 610 Cedar Lane, Lemorre, CA 93245
for the sum of
TEN DOLLARS AND OTHER GOOD AND VALUABLE CONSIDERATION--~--...:M~
::
the fo11owiilg described tract of land in
Sanpete
County,
State of Utah:

H

il

1i:
'•!
:!

10 acres, described as the North one-half of the South two-fifths of Lot 2,
i\
Section 4, Township 15 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base & Meridian,
:i
more particularly described as follows: Commencing at a point located South 990 1 1\
of the Northwest corner of Lot 2, Section 4 Township 15 South, Range 5 East, ;l
Salt Lake Base and. Meridian: thence South 330 1 , the,11:c·e East 1320 1 , thence North:
3301 , thence West 1320'. to p~int of ~eginning. ·
·
'
j!

I

I

j!

Ten acres, located in the South one-third of the North three-fifths of Lot 2, Sec~ior
4, Township 15 ·south, Rarige 5 East, Salt Lake Base and Meridian, more partic4Jarl·
described as. follows: Commencing at a point located South 660' of the Northwes_t 1
corner of Lot 2, Section 4, Township 15 South, Range 5 East, Salt Lake Base and
··
Meridian: thence South 330 1 , thence E~st 1320 1 , thence North 330', thence West )
.~
1320 1 , to point of beqinning.
.
iI
\Exr~pting a right of way
ingress and egress. over and across. said property the locatjor
'Ff ·ich shall be determined by Diversified Marketing, Inc., a corporation of Utah, or !its
· !s}--assors and pssions, and also subject to easements 1 restrictions and right of way ap: bar
·. ;o recorl4h&rofTft~~rc;~c9lfigW tfflsY d@elP h~~¼:eilfif.t ~effiis 8e8PanH>'tl!e'E~fer represent~d
::
thereby was duly authori.zed under a resolution duly adopted by the board of directors of the
:;
•
gr~ntorat a lawfqlrneetmg duly held and attended by a quort.m.
·
:·
In witness whereof, the grantor has caused it~ corp0rate name and seal to be hereunto affixed
,·
by its duly authorized officers this 18th
day of December
, A. D. 1980
\;

for

~

'I

1:
j:

Attest:

a

~

DIVERSIFIED MARKETING

INC

Secretary.
President.

[CORPORATE SEAL]

STATE OF UTAH,
County of

UTAH

On the 18th
day of
December
, A. D.1980
personally appeared before meDwayne C. Watson and
Teddie G. Watson
who being by me duly sworn did say, each for himself, that he, the said Dwayne C. Watson
is the
president, and he, the said Teddie G. Watson
is the secretary
of DIVERSIFIED MARKETING, INC.
, and that the within and foregoing
instrument was signed in behalf of said corporation by authority of a resolution of its board of
directors and said Dwayne C. Watson
and Teddie G. Watson
each
. ---..... w)edged to me that said corporation executed the same and that the seal af :'ixed
~e .!!~~~ ~ s
orporation.
~
/4.,

/·

/

,0'·<-<·:\~')~ec~~.7/'~
·•.
~,~~
·.:··_.-;-

i {" ·
I

i

! i.

Ii i\.; 'y.'\:\
I\.

l;
i

I

I
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n-r
. .,_' /~.~ . . ,,..

\

~ \~

8
\
·y coiiiriiiis.foi1 exl'pire1·>
~ , --·~J
• ._,,
or,
:.

M_

~

/Q -(

7! -

er J

·,

L~:/./..-

My residence is

/

••

~~
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~-,\~,.
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.... ~

FO~~~-··

Notary Pubiic.
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a corpo1'ation

:: '·•-~-.::.:.:.:_......\,_.

(Corporate Form)
DI\lE~~IFI\sD J•l/lRKF;TING,

me o

org:mized nnd existing ni1ric1· the· laws of the State of Utah, with its principal office, at
OREl'I
, of County of
UTA..;,:
, State of Utah,
s-rnntor, hereby conveys and warrants to RONALD JAY SMITH A:ND CECILE MARJORIE
DD:Oll SMITH, HIS WT..l!"""'E, -~ JOINT TEN.ANTS .PJ{D NOT AS TEN.f\l~S IN COMI1ON,

WITH FULL RIGHTS OF SURVIVORSHIP.

I

I
l .
I
'.

•

:

I
i

State of Utah:

i'

j

Grantee
of

PROVO, UTAH
. for the sum of
TEW ----------------------------------------------------------------O-OLLARS,
the following described trD.ct of land in
S.b.lU'ETE
County,

See Exhibit "A"
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HORSESHOE 1\1-ijUl\l'T.AIN LODGE & RESTlruRANT
P.O. Box 39 • 850 South Hwy 89 •Mt.Pleasant, Utah 84647

0±>

PROPERTY USE AGREEMENT
BETWEEN
MR. DAVID L. PETERSON
&

HORSE~HOE MOUNTAIN RESORT L.C.

vJ

vi

transport

.,.... i~l(
It is agreed that Horseshoe Mountain Resort L.C. will construct
a gate with a lock, across the access roadway~ downhill from
"Buckhorn Flats'• to prevent unauthorized entry and deter
vandalism.(Mr. Peterson will be given a key to the lock.)
Also, Horseshoe Mountain Resort L.C. will construct road
improvements on the access road to "Buckhorn Fl,ats
This work
will be for their own use, and at no c.qst to Mr. Peterson.
11

•

With Horseshoe Mountain Resort L.C., having exclusive rights of
ingress and egress, to Tlie Buckhorn Flats" property and access
11

Lodge

FAX

Restaurant .

1 (800)
801/462-3121
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HORSESHOE 1\1".:JUNTA.IN LODGE 6 REST.Ki/RANT
P.O. Box 39 • 850 South Hwy 89 •Mt.Pleasant, Utah 84647
road (with. the exception of the immediate family of Mr. David L.
Peterson). No other person, organization or company, shall have
any rights or business in this area while this agreement is in
force.
As full and complete compensation to Mr. David L. Peterson for
the use of his "-Buckhorn Flats" property and access roadway,
Horseshoe Mountain Resort agrees to pay Mr. Peterson a sum equal
to 4% of the gross ticket sales, up to a maximum total of
- $1,000.00 per week during the Wagon Ride and Chuckwagon Dinner
season.

6_~~r..__·
__·-_·___ Day

Signed this _ _.........

1996

of

:-.

Alden L. Johansen
Owner
Horseshoe Mountain Resort

·•:::x:::;!!I:;:;if¥ffo,~-~"~t,i;;~•~;'·. ~

Lodge
1 (800) 462-9330

FAX
801/462-3121

Restaurant
801/462-9533
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